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INTRODUCTION 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
(Dodd-Frank) 1, is Congress's answer to the 2008 financial crises that began when HSBC 
revealed $3.2 billion in write-downs linked to the U.S. sub-prime market? Ironically, 
Congress was forced to pass Dodd-Frank only eight years after passing the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which followed a crisis stemming from the failures of Enron 
and W orldcom. 3 One could reasonable assume, if Congress faces two financial crises 
within ten years, the second time around it would pass a more robust financial reform 
law. Unfortunately, Congress's handling and its final enactment of Dodd-Frank appears 
more like a fumbled opportunity than a successful reform of Wall Street. 4 
Congress, by passing the enacted version of Dodd-Frank, squandered the 
opportunity to pass a robust financial reform law, because Wall Street lobbied5 the 
1 Posting of Jesse Lee to The White House Blog, President Obama Signs Wall Street Reform: "No Easy 
Task," http://www. whitehouse.gov/blog/20 10/07 /21/president-obama-signs-wall-street-reform-no-easy-task 
(July 21, 2010,2:22 PM EST). 
2 BBC, HSBC in new sub-prime writedown, May. 12 2008, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7395425.stm (last visited Nov. 30, 2011) (HSBC was the first bank to 
write down its sub-prime investments). 
3 SOX was passed in reaction to corporate governance issues that were discovered following the failures of 
Enron and WorldCom. Both Enron and World entered bankruptcy proceedings following the revelations of 
deceptive accounting practices and "executives' self-dealing transactions." Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1524, 1591-1592 (2005). 
The scandals at Enron and Worldcom were not isolated. Id News of corporate shenanigans were also 
discovered at Global Crossing, Tyco, and Adelphia. !d. 
4 Congress, similar to the manner in which it passes SOX, responds to public outrage following the 
fmancial crisis of 2008 by passing a law directed towards Wall Street. Stephan M. Bainbridge, Dodd-
Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1780 (2011). Professor 
Roberta Romano asserts that Congress, following a major fmancial collapse, often feels pressure to pass 
something "with the specific content of less concern and importance." Romano Supra note 7, at 1526. 
5 Lobbyists generally gain access to members of Congress and their staff through large campaign 
contributions. Marion McLane Read, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Looking Beyond Statutes and the 
First Amendment to Address Ethical Concerns in Federal Lobbying, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 783, at 787 
(20 11 ). It is illegal for lobbyists to manipulate Congressional members with money but large campaign 
contributions will usually grant a lobbyist access to a particular Congressional member or their staff. Id 
Lobbyist use access to the legislative member so they can attempt to convince the legislators behind a 
proposed law that their interest are aligned. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This "Lobbying" That We Are So 
Worried About?, 26 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 485, at 494 (2008). The lobbyists may influence other legislators 
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legislators until it got what it wanted-a weakened law.6 Dodd-Frank began as a law 
intended to reform Wall Street, however, it ended up being a law subjugated by Wall 
Street because: (1) Wall Street and other political factors, influenced Congress into 
softening proposed sections that would have a) stopped risky Wall Street practices and b) 
capped the size of banks, and (2), the new agencies tasked with increasing transparency 
and identifying risk are subject to potential intervention from Wall Street that will 
Vi 
weaken their effectiveness. 
Part I of this paper outlines Congress's goals in passing Dodd-Frank. Part I 
explores the early legislative history behind the law in order to find Congress's intent in 
passing Dodd-Frank. This sections concludes by examining three sections of Dodd-Frank 
to illustrate how Congress's intent to reform Wall Street is altered, so that the enacted 
legislation is favorable to Wall Street. 
Part II of this paper explores two new agencies created by Dodd-Frank, which 
focus on transparency and risk identification. 7 Part II discuses the strengths and weakness 
of the new agencies and the potential for Wall Street to influence them. Part III offers a 
proposal for Congress the next time it considers to reform Wall Street. Part III attempts to 
test the proposal against the goals in Dodd-Frank. With no foresight of when the next 
to put pressure on "targeted legislators" to amend the proposed law so that it is favorable to their interest. 
I d. 
6 In the first nine months of 20 I 0 3,659 lobbyists worked for companies that explicitly lobbied on the 
Dodd-Frank bill, compared to 2,375 in the whole 2009. Shannay Basar, Lobbying Dodd-Frank, FINANCIAL 
NEWS, Nov. I2, 2010, available at http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2010-11-I2/lobbyists-dodd-frank 
(last visited Dec. 6, 2011). The "top ten banks, in terms of deposits, reported spending a total of$87 million 
lobbying Congress on multiple issues, including the Dodd-Frank legislation, from 2009 to 20IO. Posting of 
Anupama Narayanswamy to SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION blog, Lobbyists swarm agencies as Dodd-Frank is 
implemented, http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/20 Ill dodd-frank-lobbying/ (July I9, 20 1I, II :34 
AM). 
7 Dodd-Frank creates two important new agencies, which focus on transparency and risk identification, the 
Office of Financial Research and the Financial Stability Oversight Council. Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, I24 Stat. 1376 (2010). [hereinafter Dodd-
Frank Act]. 
3 
financial crisis is going to occur, this paper suggests that in the future Congress should 
pass a less politically polarizing bill, in which it creates a Systemic Insurance Fund that 
forces Wall Street to pay for its own risky behavior.8 
8 Financial and banking lobbyists, "if successful in opposing ... [a] ... proposed legislation [such as Dodd-
Frank] ... will [divest] protections for average consumes and investors." C.M.A. Me Cauliff, Didn't Your 
Mother Teach You to Share?: Wealth, Lobbying and Distributive Justice in the Wake of the Economic 
Crisis, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 383,428 (2010). 
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I. DOES DODD-FRANK ACCOMPLISH CONGRESS'S INTENT TO REFORM WALL 
STREET? 
President Barack Obama signed Dodd-Frank into law on July 21, 2010. 9 The 
111th Congress had several goals when it passed Dodd-Frank. 10 In the preamble Congress 
articulated those goals as follows: 
To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end 'too big to fail,' to 
protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from 
abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes. 11 
Commentators and some courts have stated that the preamble of a statute can be 
conferred as a source to determine a legislator's intent when it passes legislation.12 The 
preamble of Dodd-Frank states that it intends "to promote ... financial stability," "to end 
9 H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009-2010). 
10 Dodd-Frank Act§ (citing to preamble). 
l1Id. 
12 Some courts have stated that the preamble of legislation is evidence of legislative intent and may be 
considered. Peffers v. City of Des Moines, 299 N.W.2d 675,678 (Iowa Sup. Ct.1980). Additionally, writers 
have stated that Congress can provide explanations of statutes in formal preambles. Benard W. Bell, 
Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public Justification approach to Statutory 
Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 24 (1999). The preamble often accompanies a "bill throughout the 
legislative process, is voted upon by ... [legislators] ... and is included in the text which is presented to the 
[President] for signature highlights the unique character of the preamble in terms of legislative intent. 
Atkins v. Deere & Co., 685 N.E.2d 342, 347 (Ill. Sup. Ct 1997). The preamble informs "the meaning of the 
remainder of the text." Dist. of. Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 643 (2008) The Supreme Court uses the 
preamble of a statute to ensure that it's reading of an operative clause is consistent with the announced 
purpose. Id See also, King v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 257 Mich. App. 303, (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (A 
preamble is useful for interpreting statutory purpose and scope); Ass'n of Am. Railroads v. Castle, 562 F.2d 
1310, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (A preamble contributes to a general understanding of a statute); United States 
v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 400, 2 L. Ed. 304 (1805) (The preamble of an act can provide knowledge regarding 
the act and it can "open" the intent of the law makers); But See SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION§ 
20:3 (7th ed.) (Alternatively some commentator's have stated that preamble cannot be used to discern 
legislative unless there is some doubt in the statute's meaning); People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 306 IlL 
Dec. 570, 858 N.E.2d 15 (2006); Some courts have stated that the preamble should be interpreted for intent 
only where there are disputed issues of statutory interpretation. Verbois v. Houston, 784 So. 2d 12 (La. Ct. 
App. 4th Cir. 2001 ); 
See generally In re Kavolchyck, 154 B.R. 793, 801 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Ass'n of Am. Railroads v. Castle, 562 
F.2d 1310, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
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to big to fail," to "protect the American taxpayer," and to "protect consumers."13 The 
phrase "too big to faiP' (TBTF) refers to the eighteen leading global large complex 
financial institutions (LCFis). 14 In order to ensure that it's intent is fulfilled; Congress 
would have to structure the sections in the body of the law in a way that would 
fundamentally change Wall Street. 15 Arguably, these changes to Wall Street would entail 
preventing LCFis from becoming too big by capping them and severely curtailing the 
types of risks they can assume. 16 
Given Wall Street's influence17 during the legislative process, the logical question 
to ask is whether the body of the statute, consisting of almost 1400 sections, falls short of 
accomplishing Congress's intent. 18 If the body of the statue does falls short of fulfilling 
13 Dodd-Frank Act 
14 In order to determine which LCFis are too big to fail federal regulators conducted stress test on the on the 
nineteen largest banking holding companies (BHCs). Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial 
Regulation to Address the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 707, 713 (2010) Professor 
Wilmarth identified some of the too big to fail companies as "the four largest U.S. banks which includes 
Bank of America, Chase, Citigroup, and Wachovia. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal 
Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REv. 
963, 980 (2009). It also includes the "five largest U.S. securities firms Bear Steams, which is now defunct, 
Goldman, Lehman Brothers, which is also defunct, Merrill, and Morgan Stanley." /d at 989. Additionally, 
this list includes the largest U.S. insurer at the time American International Group (AIG). Id at 994. 
Outside of the U.S it includes "eight foreign universal banks Barclays, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse, 
Deutsche, HSBC, RBS, SociEtE GEnErale, and UBS." /d. at 994. According to Professor Wilmarth "the 
big eighteen dominated global and U.S. markets for securities underwriting, securitizations, structured 
fmancial products, and OTC derivatives." Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and 
Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 Or. L. Rev. 951, 1057 (2011). 
15 Dodd-Frank on its face is structured in a manner that appears to address: too big to fail, loopholes in 
regulation, transparency of hedge funds, limiting the size of the largest firms, executive pay, separating 
banking and speculative trading, consumer protections, bad mortgage practices, transparent derivates, and 
prevention of a future crises. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, Top Ten Things You Should Know 
about the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Oct. 2010 available at 
http://www.treasur.gov/wallstreetreform (last visited Nov. 30, 20 11). 
16 See Kat Aaron, Predatory Lendings: A Decade of Warnings, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, May. 
6. 2009, http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/economic_meltdown/articles/entry/1309/ (last 
visited Dec. 5, 2011). 
17 See Michael Beckel, Lobbyists' Newest Targets in Wall Street Reform Battle? Federal Oversight 
Agencies, OPENSECERTS.ORG, Nov. 11, 2010, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/11/lobbyists-newest-
targets-in-wall-st.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2011) (discussing Wall Street lobbying on Dodd-Frank). 
18 Dodd-Frank Act§ (citing to preamble). 
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Congress's intent then whose intent is reflected in the law? 19 One might argue that certain 
sections reflect Wall Street intent. 20 
A. How did Congress formulate its initial intent to pass Dodd-Frank? 
When Congress passed Dodd-Frank it sought to ensure that problematic Wall 
Street practices are stopped.21 One way in which Congress intended to accomplish this 
goal was by addressing the issue of the federal safety net22 that Wall Street used during 
the crisis. 23 
In order to gain a better understanding of how Congress formulated its intent, a 
logical place to start is the legislative history of Dodd-Frank.24 In examining the 
legislative history, the reader should be mindful, that as Congress was legislating, 
19 Wall Street's intent is evidenced by the manner in which it hired lobbyists to mold the legislation so that 
it favored its interest. Reza Dibadj, Dodd-Frank: Toward First Principles?, I5 CHAP. L. REv. 79, at 103 
(201 I). Arguably, the Wall Street lobbyists played a crucial role in fostering an elaborate, yet perhaps less 
effective, statute. Id Further proof of that Wall Street influence, the Centre for Public Integrity, a non-
partisan research group, reckons the fmancial-services industries alone hired more than 3,000 lobbyists to 
influence Dodd-Frank. Cheques and Imbalances: Financial firms bet on Republicans to fight for their 
interests, ECONOMIST, June 11,2010, at 33, available at http://www.economist.com/node/l6380025?story_ 
id=16380025&CFID=I65030874&CFTOKEN=60263434 (last visited Nov. 30, 20I I). 
20 See infra section B. 
21 Dodd-Frank Act (citing to preamble). 
22 During instances where there is "a systemic crisis, safety net subsidies become much larger because the 
federal government, in effect, provides 'catastrophe insurance."' Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Subprime Crisis 
Confirms Wisdom of Separating Banking and Commerce, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP., May 
2008, at I, 5 available at http://ssm.com/abstract=I263453. As Professor Wilmarth has documented, the 
federal "safety net" for fmancial institutions includes (1) federal deposit insurance, (2) protection of 
uninsured depositors and other uninsured creditors ofTBTF institutions, and (3) discount window advances 
and other liquidity assistance provided by the Federal Reserve bank FRB as "lender of last resort" (LOLR), 
and (4) the FRB's guarantee of interbank payments made on Fedwire. Id. at 16, See also Joe Peek & James 
A. Wilcox, "The Fall and Rise of Banking Safety Net Subsidies," in Too Big to Fail: Policies and Practices 
in Government Bailouts 169, 179-183 (Benton E. Gup, ed. 2004); John R. Walter, "Can a Safety Net 
Subsidy Be Contained?," 84 Economic Quarterly No. I, Fed. Res. Bank of Rich., VA, at 1, 2 (I998) 
23 See Gary H.Stem & Ron J. Feldman, Managing the Expanded Safety Net, May. I, 2008, THE FED. 
RESERVE BANK MINN. Available at 
http://www .minneapolisfed.org/publications _papers/pub_ display .cfin ?id=34 71 (last visited Nov. 3 0, 20 1 I). 
24 See Stephen Breyer, On the uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statues, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 
848-860 (1992) (discussing using legislative history to help interpret statutory language seems natural. 
Legislative history helps a court understand the context and purpose of a statute. The legislative history can 
help determine Congressional intent); See also Federal Legislative History, DUKE LAW, available at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/lib/researchguides/fedleg (last visited Nov. 30, 2011) ("Statements made in 
testimony before the committee considering the proposed legislation or by committee members have been 
accepted by courts as evidence of legislative intent"). 
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millions of Americans were losing their homes, major U.S. bank were reporting massive 
writedowns25, and some banks were collapsing.26 Congress began the arduous process 
towards formulating its intent on February 4, 2009 when the United States Senate held a 
hearing titled "Modernizing the U.S Financial Regulatory System."27 In this hearing, 
Senator Christopher J. Dodd affirmed that Congress's mission is to craft a framework for 
21st century financial regulation that is informed by lessons learned from the 2008 
crisis?8 Furthermore, the new regulation should be designed so that it prevents excesses 
that wreaked havoc on homeowners and plunged the economy into a recession. 29 This 
hearing was the first of many hearings where members of Congress and other financial 
25 See PBS, Foreclosure crisis pushes more Americans out of Their Homes, Oct. 22, 2010, 
http:/ /www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/economics/july-dec 1 0/Foreclosure _1 0-22.html (last visited 
Dec. 6. 2011) (discussing the number of Americans that lost their homes as a result of the financial crisis); 
Ruthie Ackerman, Bank of America, Wachovia Crushed, Jan. 22, 2008, FORBES, available at 
http://wwwforbes.com/2008/01/22/bankofamerica-wachovia-financials-markets-equity-cx-ra-
OI22markets23.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2011) (discussing some of the loses that major banks were facing 
at the tin1e ). 
26 See Peter S. Goodman, Big Spenders? They Wish, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/business/economy/13excerpt.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Nov. 
30, 2011) (Millions of Americans have lost homes, jobs and savings to the fmancial crisis and recession). 
See also David Ellis, Lehman Brothers collapse stuns global markets, CNN, Sept. 1, 2008, available at 
http:/ledition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/09/15/lehman.merrill.stocks.turmoiVindex.html (last visited Nov. 
30, 2011). Rodney Yap & Dave Pierson, Subprime Mortgage-Related Losses Exceed $1.77 Trillion: Table, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 11, 2010 (A table in the article shows "the $815.6 billion in asset writedowns and 
credit losses at more than 100 of the world's biggest banks and securities firms as well as the $855.7 billion 
capital raised to cope with them"). 
Quoting Professsor Willmarth, "household net worth in the United States fell by more than one-fifth (from 
$64.2 trillion to $48.8 trillion) from the end of2007 through the first quarter of2009." Wilmarth, A Flawed 
and Inadequate Response, Supra note 14, at 960. 
27 Modernizing the US. Financial Regulatory System: Hearing Before the US. Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111 th Cong. (2009) (statement of Sen. Dodd, Chairman, Comm. On 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs). 
28 Id See generally, Fed Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc:., 426 U.S. 548, (1976) (As a statement of 
one of the legislation's sponsors, this explanation is likely to be given some weight in interpreting the 
statute), Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, (1935) (the legislative reports demonstrate 
congressional intent). But see, Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499, (2010) (discussing that "whatever 
interpretive force one attaches to legislative history, the Court normally gives little weight to statements, 
such as those of the individual legislators, made after the bill in question has become law"). 
29 Statement of Sen. Dodd Supra note 27. 
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regulators would testify or submit statements regarding regulation of the financial 
industry.30 
One of the earliest bills introduced in the House was narrow in scope and focused 
mainly on mortgage reform) as its title suggests "Mortgage Reform & Anti-Predatory 
Lending Act. "31 The House) in this early bill, focused on issues that originated with 
mortgage lenders.32 As time passed Congress determined that any new law needed to 
include measures to improve systematic stability) measures to improve options for 
dealing with failing firms, transparency of financial markets, and protections for 
consumers. 33 As the events from the financial crisis became more publicized) the scope of 
what Congress needed to do grew, and thus it's intent behind Dodd-Frank began to take 
shape. 34 Motivated by "populist outrage" Congress over the months following the 
financial crisis appeared as if it intended to make dramatic changes on Wall Street. 35 
30 See FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, Reforming the Nation's Financial System, available at 
http://regtimeline.stlouisfed.org/timeline.cfin (last visited Nov. 30, 2011) (contains the timeline of hearings 
held by Congress). 
31 H.R.1728, 111th Congress (2009-2010); See also Federal Legislative History, DUKE LAW, available at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/liblresearchguides/fedleg (last visited Nov. 30, 2011) ("Frequently, before the 
fmal version of a bill is reported to the floor, a committee will consider alternative versions or proposed 
amendments. Comparing the enacted language with that found in earlier versions of the bill, or in 
amendments that were not accepted, can better illustrate the intent of the fmal version"). 
32 Id (In title II sought to set minimum standards for mortgages. In title III it sought to regulate high cost 
mortgages). 
33 See Baird Webel, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Issues and 
Summary, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, July 29, 2010, available at, 
http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/files/232/CRS-R41350.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2011). 
34 See Testimony of Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Causes of the Recent Financial and 
Economic Crisis, Statement Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, (Sept. 2, 20 10 ), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bemanke20 1 00902a.htm. (last visited Dec. 6, 2011) . 
35 Bainbridge Supra note 4 at 1782. See also Andrew Leonard, The Dodd-Frank bank reform bill: A deeply 
flawed success, SALON, June 25, 2010 available at 
http:/lpolitics.salon.com/2010/06/25/the_dodd_frank_bank_refoim_bill/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2011) 
(Describing Dodd-Frank as a "concatenation of intricate compromises tied up in 2,000"). 
9 
As Congress learned more about how the financial crisis occurred, it appeared 
that Wall Street was the catalyst.36 The moment that Congress began to add provisions in 
the law that impacted Wall Street practices, Wall Street began lobbying to weaken Dodd-
Frank.37 The question is what happened to Congress's intent to reform Wall Street? This 
paper argues that Congress gave into Wall Street influence and that as a result Dodd-
Frank does not adequately reform Wall Street. 38 
B. How did Wall Street circumvent Congress's intent in the final enactment 
of Dodd-Frank? 
Dodd-Frank is severally weakened in its enacted form.39 During the legislative 
process of Dodd-Frank, there are several examples where Congress, in its initial proposal, 
directly addresses an important issue, only to weaken its effectiveness prior to its 
enactment. 40 In each instance that this occurs, the impact of that section of the law is 
36 Large complex fmancial institutions from Wall Street "were the primary private-sector catalysts for the 
crisis, and they received the lion's share of support from government programs that were established during 
the crisis to preserve fmancial stability." Wilmarth, A Flawed and Inadequate Response, Supra note 14, at 
955. 
37 Several well-known Wall Street banks such as Goldman Sachs Group Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., and 
Bank of America Corp lobbied against portions of Dodd-Frank that would hurt their fmancial results." Clea 
Benson & Phil Mattingly, Firms That Fought Dodd-Frank May Gain Under New House, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, November 3, 2010 available at http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-11-03/frrms-
that-fought-dodd-frank-may-gain-under-new-house.html, (last visited Dec. 6, 2011); See also Jim 
Kuhhenn, Chamber, Wall Street lobby seek to alter Dodd Bill, BREITBART, Mar. 16, 2008, 
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9EG1D400&show_article=1 (last visited Dec. 6, 2011). 
38 See Posting of Simon Johnson to The Baseline Scenario Blog, Dead on Arrival: Financial Reform Fails, 
http:/lbaselinescenario.com/2010/06/21/dead-on-arrival-fmancial-reform-fails/ (June 21, 2010, 7:04 AM 
EST). (Congress intended to end too-big-to-fail but Dodd-Frank allows for these large institutions to 
continue in existence). Leonard Supra note 35. (Congress made numerous concessions regarding derivates 
products that benefit Wall Street instead of reforming the trading of these risking products. ) Simon 
Johnson, Flawed Financial Bill Contains Huge Surprise, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 8, 201 0), 
http://www. businessweek.com/news/20 10-07-0 8/flawed-fmancial-bill-contains-huge-surprise-simon-
johnson.html ("Scouring all2,400 or so pages of the bill, which has now passed the House and awaits fmal 
passage in the Senate, it is hard to fmd anything that will substantially change how Wall Street operates"). 
39 See Christian Evans, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: A Missed 
Opportunity to Rein in Too-Big-to-Fail Banks, 13 DUQ. Bus. L.J. 43, 57 (2011) (author concludes that 
Dodd-Frank fails to take into account many of the problems that TBTF pose to the economy. As a result, 
another economic catastrophe is inevitable) Leonard Supra note 35. 
40 See notes 41-65 and accompanying text. 
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scaled back considerably. Each time that Congress scales back the proposed legislation, 
the law overall, moves further way from accomplishing the goals in the preamble. 
In the pre-Dodd-Frank world there was a federal safety that Wall Street firms 
were allowed to use if they were labeled TBTF.41 Members of Congress proposed several 
provisions to address Wall Street's use of the federal safety net. 42 This paper focuses on 
three of those provisions. Two of the provisions were substantially weakened during the 
legislating process, while the third passed only after a much stronger bill was voted 
down.43 The fashion in which Wall Street, on more than one occasion, influenced 
Congress to scale back proposed legislation exemplifies why Dodd-Frank will struggle to 
fulfill its goal of reforming Wall Street. 
1. The V olcker Rule 
As enacted in section 619, the V olcker Rule 4\ places limits on proprietary 
trading45 and speculative trading.46 However, this rule as initially proposed, would have 
completely prohibited the use of the federal safety net by banks engaged in proprietary 
trading and speculative trading.47 Former Federal Reserve Bank Chairman Paul Volcker 
proposed the Volcker rule.48 According to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs report, the proposed Volcker rule would have prevented taxpayer funds 
41 Stem & J. Feldman Supra note 23. 
42 See Johnson, BLOOMBERG, Supra note 38. (discussing the federal safety net provisions) 
43 ld 
44 Dodd-Frank Act § 619(a)-(b) (a banking entity shall not engage in proprietary trading; or acquire or 
retain any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor a hedge fund or a private equity 
fund). 
45 Wilmarth, A Flawed and Inadequate Response, Supra note 14, at 1025 (i.e., buying and selling securities, 
derivatives, and other tradable assets for their own account) 
46/d 
47 See Louis Uchitelle, Volcker Pushes for Reform, Regretting Past Silence, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2010, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/20 10/07 /11/business/11 volcker.html?pagewanted=all (last visited 
Dec. 10, 2011). 
48/d. 
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from being used to essentially support proprietary and speculative trading.49 The Senate 
report explains that the proposed Volcker rule would have prevented deposit insurance 
and other federal safety nets from being used to "subsidize speculative capital markets 
activities."5° Further, the proposed version 
prohibited banks and [bank holding companies] from (1) sponsoring or investing 
in hedge funds or private equity funds and (2) engaging in proprietary trading 
(i.e., buying and selling securities, derivatives, and other tradable assets for their 
own account)51 
Essentially, the Volcker rule would have limited the conflicts that banks face when they 
bet against the clients they represent. 
Not surprising, the LCFis opposed the proposed V olcker Rule because it would 
lead to a fundamental change in the way LCFis earn money on their own accounts. 52 
However, two events related to Goldman Sachs allowed the Volcker rule to gain some 
momentary momentum.53 First, there was a lawsuit filed by the SEC on April 16, 2010, 
against Goldman Sachs alleging that it defrauded two institutional investors. 54 Second, on 
April 27, 2010, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Oversight interrogated several 
employees from Goldman Sachs regarding the selling of mortgage-backed instruments 
49 SeeS. Rep. No. 111-176, at 90. 
50 Id. 
51 See Wilmarth, A Flawed and Inadequate Response, Supra note 14, at 1025. 
52 See S. Rep. No. 111-176, See Kevin L. Petrasic, The Volcker Rule - Impact and Implications for 
Passage, (March 2010), available at http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1537.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 6, 2011, Eamon Javers & Victoria McGrane, Chris Dodd Proposal Hits Wall Street Hard, 
POLITICO, Mar. 16, 201 0), http:// www.politico.com/news/stories/031 0/34463 .html (last visited 6, 2011) 
(the proposed Volcker rule "hated on Wall Street") . 
53 Securities and Exchange Comm'n, Litigation Release No. 21A89 (April 16, 2010). (SEC charges 
Goldman Sachs with Fraud), Posting of Zachary A. Goldfarb to Daily Strength, Goldman Sachs Executives 
Face Senators Investigating Role in Financial Crisis, http://www.dailystrength.org/groups/true-
debate/discussions/messages/9619824, (April 27, 2010, 10:48 PM EST). (Congress intended to end too-
big-to-fail but Dodd-Frank allows for these large institutions to continue in existence). 
54 See id SEC Litigation Release. 
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while Goldman was betting against the housing market. 55 The combination of these two 
events provided a momentary political boost to the Volcker Rule and the Dodd-Frank 
legislation. 56 
Despite the events plaguing Goldman Sachs, large financial institutions, such as 
Goldman Sachs, continued to lobby to weaken the proposed Volcker rule. 57 The lobbying 
effort on behalf of financial institutions eventually led to several concessions, such as 
allowing banks to "increase up the forty percent the amount of money they put into risky 
investment vehicles."58 Eventually, Democratic leaders in both the House and Senate 
agreed to weaken the Volcker rule. 59 The most alarming concession is the delay of the 
Volcker Rule's effective date so that banks and bank holding companies will have 
(I) up to seven years after Dodd-Frank's enactment date to bring most of their 
equity-investing and proprietary-trading activities into compliance with the 
Volcker Rule and (2) up to twelve years to bring 'illiquid' investments that were 
already in existence on May 1, 2010, into compliance with the Rule.60 
55 See Joshua Gallu & Jesse Westbrook, Goldman Armed Salespeople to Dump Bonds, £-mails Show, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 27, 2010), http:!/industry-news.org/2010/04/28/goldman-armed-
salespeople-to-dump-bonds-e-mails-show/ (last visited Dec. 6) 
56 Id. 
57 See John Cassidy, The Volcker Rule, July 26, 2010, THE NEW YORKER, July 26, 20IO, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/20 I 0/07/26/1 00726fa _fact_ cassidy (last visited Dec. 6, 201 O) 
(discussing the volcker rule); Yalman Onaran, Volcker Rule Attacked as Lawmakers Seek Fund Loophole, 
BLOOMBERG, Jun. 23, 20 I 0, http://www .bloomberg.com/news/20 I 0-06-23/volcker-rule-under-attack -as-
lawmakers-seek-hedge-fund-loophole.html, (last visited Dec. 6, 20 I 0) (discussing lobbying efforts by 
banks on the proposed Volcker rule). 
58 See Id. Cassidy. 
59 See. Id.; See Wilmarth, A Flawed and Inadequate Response, Supra note I4, at 1028. 
The compromise inserted exemptions in the Volcker Rule that allow banks and BHCs (1) to 
invest up to three percent of their Tier I capital in hedge funds or private equity funds (as 
long as a bank's investments do not exceed three percent of the total ownership interests in 
any single fund), (2) to purchase and sell government securities, (3) to engage in 'risk-
mitigating hedging activities,' (4) to make investments through insurance company 
affiliates, and (5) to make small business investment company investments. 
See also Dodd- Frank Act§ 619 (enacting§§ 13(d)(l)(A), (B), (C), (E), (F), (G). 
60 See Wilmarth, A Flawed and Inadequate Response, Supra note 59, at 1028. 
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A former co-chief executive officer of Chase's investment bank~ William T. Winters~ 
made the following statement regarding the Volcker rule "I don't think [that it] will have 
any impact at all on n1ost banks."61 
As initially proposed~ the Volcker rule sought to take away the federal safety net 
that supported proprietary trading and speculative market trading.62 However~ Wall 
Street benefits from the enacted version of the Volcker Rule because it contains 
ambiguous terms and numerous exemptions that rely on regulatory interpretation.63 
Professor Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr concludes that commentators believe the rule will not 
have a significant impact in preventing banks from exploiting the safety net subsidies to 
fund speculative activities. 64 
The manner in which the Volcker rule is weakened provides a clear example 
where Congress's intent is not fulfilled. Here, Congress does not accomplish its goal 
reform Wall Street. In fact, Wall Street can continue it's proprietary and speculative 
trading with the federal safety net for the foreseeable future. 65 
2. The Lincoln Amendment 
Another major example where a section of Dodd-Frank is weakened is found in 
section 726-the "Lincoln Amendment. "66 Senator Blanche Lincoln, the chair of the 
Senate Agriculture Committee, recommended on April 21, 2010, a bill that would bring 
61 See Christine Harper, Bradly Keoun, The Financial Reform Law: A 'Fig Leaf', BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, July 1, 2010, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_28/b4186042369207.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2010). 
62 See Senate Report No. 111-176 at 8. 
63 See Wilmarth, A Flawed and Inadequate Response, Supra note 14, at 1030. 
64 !d. 
65 See Supra notes 48-67. 
66 See Christine Harper & Bradley Keoun, Supra note 61. 
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"100 percent transparency" to derivatives trading.67 The proposed bill mandated the 
reporting of all derivatives trading. 68 The bill would require a segment of derivatives to 
be cleared by a central repository and traded on a registered exchange.69 Interestingly, the 
proposed bill also contained a clause that would prohibit banks that act as derivative 
dealers from receiving federal assistance. 70 
The premise behind the proposed Lincoln amendment was to force major banks to 
"spin off their derivatives operations" and to limit situations where taxpayer bailouts 
would be required.71 The Lincoln amendment had similar objectives to the Volcker Rule, 
but the Lincoln Amendment focused on derivatives instead of all types of trading. 72 The 
bill would have forced banks to make a choice-either be a bank or engage in risky 
trading but not both. 73 
Not surprising, the Lincoln Amendment engendered tremendous pushback from 
Republicans, fellow Democrats, the White House, banking regulators, and Wall Street 
interests. 74 Wall Street claimed that as proposed it would require firms to raise more $100 
billion of additional capital to create separate derivatives trading subsidiaries. 75 
67 See Richard Hill, Lincoln Derivatives Language Recommended by AG Pane; Merger with Dodd Bill 
Expected, 42 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 810, (2010) (discussing the proposed Lincoln amendment and the 
goals ofthe amendment). 
68See id 
69 See id. 
70 I d. (Banks that act as derivative dealers would be barred from receiving assistance from the federal 
deposit insurance and access to the Federal Reserve discount window). 
71 See Richard Hill, Derivatives: Conferees Reach Compromise: Banks Could Continue to Trade Some 
Derivatives, 42 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1234 (June 28, 2010) (discussing goals and compromises of the 
Lincoln amendment). 
72 See Wilmarth, A Flawed and Inadequate Response, Supra note 14, at 103 1. See Cassidy Supra note 57. 
73 See !d. Cassidy. (Lincoln said after the vote that "banks need to decide if they want to be banks or if they 
want to engage in the risky trading that caused the collapse of firms such as AIG"). 
74 See Wilmarth, A Flawed and Inadequate Response, Supra note 14, at 1032. 
75 See Agnes Crane & Rolfe Winkler, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/20 10/05/03/business/economy/03views.html (last visited Dec. 6, 20 11) 
(discussing the cost of creating new subsidiaries under the proposed Volcker rule). 
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Here, politics perhaps played more of a role in the weakening of this amendment. 
In proposing section 726, Senator Lincoln was motivated by personal political reasons.76 
Prior to proposing the amendment she was being accused of being too close to Wall 
Street.77 Despite Senator Lincoln's support for this new rule she eventually lost her re-
election bid and the bill lost its initial sponsor. 78 
Similar to the Volcker Rule, the Democrats made last minute concessions before 
the final version of the Lincoln amendment was passed. 79 Professor Wilmarth suggests 
that the compromised Lincoln Amendment will require major banks to spin off only 10-
20% of their existing derivatives activities into separate affiliates. 8° Commentators 
conclude that the Lincoln Amendment was watered down, with the result that the largest 
bank derivatives operations are largely left intact."81 
The concessions made in the final enactment of the Lincoln amendment are 
another example where Congress proposed a solution only to weaken prior to enactment. 
In weakening the Lincoln amendment Congress's intent to directly address a risky Wall 
Street practice went unfulfilled. 
76 See Wilmarth, A Flawed and Inadequate Response, Supra note 14, at 1032 (discussing Senator Lincoln~s 
political motivations for proposing the Lincoln amendment). 
77 ld 
78 ld 
79 See David Cho, Jia Lynn Yang & Brady Dennis, Lawmakers guide Wall Street into homestretch; 
Industry left largely intact Regulators to gain more sway over risky investments, GARP, June 26, 2010, 
http://www.garp.org/news-and-publications/overview/story.aspx?newsld=14166 ("Sen. Blanche Lincoln 
(D-Ark.) agreed to scale back a controversial provision that would have forced the nation's biggest banks to 
spin off their lucrative derivatives-dealing businesses. The proposal had been a particularly thorny issue for 
Democrats, causing internal divisions that threatened to derail the entire process.") 
80 See Wilmarth, A Flawed and Inadequate Response, Supra note 14, at 1033. 
81 !d. at 1034. 
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3. The Kanj orski Amendment 
Unlike the abovementioned sections, section 121 of Dodd-Frank, the "Kanjorski 
Amendment" passed closer to the proposed language,82 but only after a more robust bill 
addressing TBTF was voted down in the Senate.83 As enacted, section 121 provides the 
Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) the authority to require banks to divest high-risk 
operations. 84 The Kanjorski amendment is a substantially weakened version of the hard 
cap on bank size introduced by Democratic Senators Sherrod Brown and Ted Kaufman. 85 
The Kanjorski Amendment sponsored by Representative Paul Kanjorki proposes 
that a group of 10 federal regulators be given the power to breakup big financial firms 
when they pose systematic risk.86 According to the language in Dodd-Frank, this statute 
would apply to, a bank holding company with total consolidated assets of 
$50,000,000,000 or more, or a nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of 
Govemors.87 Moreover, before any action can take place, an affirmative vote of not fewer 
than % of the voting members of the Council need to be in place. 88 The term Council in 
Dodd-Frank refers to the new agency the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC).89 
82 See Johnson BLOOMBERG Supra note 38. (discussing how the bill survived despite the influence from 
Wall Street) 
83 See Emily Calhoun, Wall Street Reform: SAFE Banking Act Fails, MAPLIGHT May 10, 20 10, 
http://maplight.org/wall-street-reform-amendments-safe-banking-act (last visited Dec. 6, 2011). 
84 Dodd-Frank Act § 121(a) (describing what the Board of Governors can do if it deems a bank holding 
company or nonbank fmancial company under their supervision is a threat to the financial stability of the 
United States. See also See Wilmarth, A Flawed and Inadequate Response, Supra note 14, at 1024. 
85 Senators Sherrod Brown and Ted Kaufman proposed the SAFE Banking Act. In section three of this 
proposal would force the big banks to break up by placing a hard cap on their size. See S.R 3241, 111th 
Cong. (2d Session) (2010) See also Johnson The Baseline Scenario Blog Supra at note 40. (discussing the 
purpose of the SAFE Banking Act). 
86 ld. 
87 Dodd-Frank Act§ 121(a) (describing the mitigatory actions that the Board of Governors must take is a 
company poses a grave threat to the fmancial stability of the United States). 
88 See Johnson BLOOMBERG Supra note 38. 
89 Dodd-Frank Act. § (2)(8) (The term "Council" means the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
established under title I.) The council includes "the treasury secretary (as chairman), the chairman of the 
Federal Reserve's Board of Governors, the director of the new consumer protection agency, the head of 
Federal Housing Finance Agency, the chair of the National Credit Union Administration board, an 
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The triggers for an intervention require that an institution be a grave threat to the 
financial stability of the United States.90 Section 121 requires that prior to any 
intervention the FRB have already attempted to "mitigate" the threat by taking less 
drastic remedial n1easures.91 Only after the FRB conducts the following actions: (1) 
imposing limits on mergers or affiliations with other companies, (2) placing restrictions 
on offering financial products, (3) requiring termination of one or more activities, and ( 4) 
imposing conditions on the manner of conducting activities, can it begin the process of 
breaking up a bank that is to big to fail. 92 
The Kanj orski amendment provides the government with tools to deal with an 
institution that is a threat to the financial stability of the U.S.93 During the 2008 financial 
crisis, the institutions that threatened the financial stability of the U.S. were those that 
were labeled TBTF.94 Thus, it appears that the Kanjorski amendment will allow TBTF 
firms to remain in existence even though the preamble of Dodd-Frank states that it 
intends to end TBTF.95 The Kanjorski amendment is a step in the right direction but it 
does not end TBTF. The Safe Banking Act proposed earlier during the Dodd-Frank 
legislation would have effectively ended TBTF as promised in the preamble. 
a. Rejection of the proposed Safe Banking Act 
Prior to the Kanj orski amendment, two Democratic Senators, Sherrod Brown and 
Ted Kaufman proposed the "Safe Banking Act of 201 0" (SBA) which proposed a hard 
individual who will represent insurance regulators and representatives from the each of the four standard 
federal regulatory agencies." See Johnson BLOOMBERG Supra note 38. 
90 Dodd-Frank Act Supra note 94. 
91 !d. § 12l(a). See Wilmarth, A Flawed and Inadequate Response, Supra note 14, at 1024. 
92 !d.§ 12l(a). 
93 Id 
94 See Supra notes 16-25 and accompany text. 
95 See Dodd-Frank Act Supra note 10 (citing to preamble); note 84. 
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size limit on banks.96 The SBA as proposed would have created size and leverage limits 
on the same institutions that are covered under the Kanjorski amendment.97 The SBA 
required the six biggest banks -- Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells 
Fargo, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley-- to significantly scale down their size.98 If 
enacted as proposed it would have ended Too Big To Fail.99 
Under the proposed bill, no single bank could hold more than "1 0% of percent of 
the total amount of deposits of insured depository institutions in the United States."100 
Furthermore, leverage limits would be set at 6%101 , and non-deposit liabilities would be 
capped at 2%102 for banks and 3%103 for non-bank firms. 104 As proposed the bill's deposit 
cap would have led to the shrinking of some of the large Wall Street banks that played a 
large role in the 2008 financial crisis. 105 The proposed bill would bar any single bank 
from holding more than $750 billion of the nation's total deposits. 106 
The SBA made it to the Senate floor but ultimately failed, 33-61. 107 During the 
vote, the bill did receive some bipartisan support but it proved too radical for majority 
96 See S.R 3241, 111 th Cong. (2d Session) (20 10) 
97 !d. (3)(d) (describing the hard cap that would be placed on banks). 
98 Ryan Grim & Shahien Nasiripour, Senate Votes for Wall Street; Megabanks to Remain Behemoths, 
HUFFINGTONPOST, June 7, 20 10, http://www .huffmgtonpost.com/20 1 0/05/06/senate-votes-for-wall-
str n 567063.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2011). 
99 ld.-
100 S.R 3241 Supra note 93 at§ (3)(d) 
101 !d. at§ (5)(a)(2) 
102 ld. at§ (S)(b)(I)(A) 
103 ld. at§ (5)(b)(2)(A) 
104 ld. 
105 S.R 3241 Supra note 93 
106 David M. Herszenhom & Swell Chan, Financial Debate Renews Scrutiny on Banks' Size,, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 28, 200 I, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20 1 0/04/22/business/22fail.html (last visited Dec. 6, 
20 10) ("Three institutions- Bank of America, Wells Fargo and J.P. Morgan Chase- are over the limit 
now, and would have to shed the excess within three years"). 
107 See Johnson BLOOMBERG Supra note 38. 
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approval. 108 An interesting fact regarding the proposed bill is that Senate democrats that 
voted against the amendment received 55% more money from the banking industry 
compared to those who voted for it. 109 Of the top six banks 110 who would have been 
impacted by SBA, campaign finance contributions to then current Senators totaled 
$5,894,844 over the last six years. 111 Furthermore, contributions to Senate Democrats 
who voted to defeat the measure were $85,496 on average, versus $50,241 for those who 
supported the Brown-Kaufman amendment. 112 
The SBA as proposed would have ended to big to fail as the preamble of Dodd-
Frank promises. Although the Kanjorski amendment made it into Dodd-Frank largely 
entact, it allows TBTF banks to remain in operation and requires numerous steps before 
such a bank could be broken up. 113 The legislative process behind the Kanjorski 
amendment is another illustration of Congress proposing a strong bill only to soften it 
after Wall Street's political influence. 
In final analysis, Congress fails short of accomplishing its intent to reform Wall 
Street. However, Dodd-Frank's legislative history provides future Congressional 
members an outline of issues should be addressed the next Congress attempts to reform 
Wall Street. 
108 See Firedoglake, Safe Banking Amendment Fails in Snap Vote, 33-61, 
http:/lnews.frredoglake.com/2010/05/07/safe-banking-amendment-fails-in-snap-vote-33-611 ((discussing 
progressive momentum behind the bill) (May 7, 2010 5:00AM) 
109 Emily Calhoun, Wall Street Reform: SAFE Banking Act Fails, May 20, 2010, http://maplight.org/wall-
street-reform-amendments-safe-banking-act (last visited Dec. 6, 20 11) 
110 The six banks that would have been impacted by this amendment are Bank of America, JPMorgan 
Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley. Calhoun Supra note 106. 
Ill fd. 
ll2 !d. 
113 See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text. 
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II. CAN THE NEW AGENCIES CREATED BY DODD-FRANK MAKE UP FOR THE SHORT 
COMINGS IN THE LAW? 
Although the enacted version of Dodd-Frank is weakened, the new law is both 
comprehensive and far-reaching. 114 Some commentators believe that the full extent of 
Dodd-Frank will not be reached until regulatory agencies implement the directives in the 
act and carry out the studies mandated in the act. 115 Despite the concessions illustrated in 
the section above, another major goal in Dodd-Frank is to improve transparency so that 
regulators can more effectively identify risk. 116 To accomplish this task, Dodd-Frank 
creates two new agencies, 1) the Office of Financial Research (OFR) and, 2) the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). 
A. Office of Financial Research 
Dodd-Frank, in section 152, establishes within the department of the Treasury the 
Office of Financial Research. 117 Already some commentators have called the OFR the 
"CIA of Finance."118 The OFR's primary goal is to assist the FSOC in fulfilling its 
purposes and duties as set out in Dodd-Frank.119 The OFR is also tasked with helping 
financial regulators identify and address intra institution and system wide problems in 
real time. 12° Furthermore, the OFR is tasked with improving the quality of financial data 
available to policymakers and fostering a more sophisticated analysis of the financial 
u4 See Dodd-Frank Act Supra note 10. Manuel A. Utset~ Complex Financial Institutions and Systemic 
Risk~ 45 GA. L. REv. 779~ 781-83 (201 1). 
115 See Dodd-Frank Act§§ 151-156 (dealing the with Office of Financial Research).Id. at 781-83. 
116 See Dodd-Frank Act§§ 111-123, 151-156 
117 Id. at§ 152 (a). 
us See Carrick Mollenkamp~ How a Street Watchdog Got Its Bite~ WALL ST. J.~ Sept. 15~ 2010~ available 
at http://frnance.yahoo.com/banking-budgeting/article/11 0671/how-a-street-watchdog-got-its-
bite?mod=bb-budgeting (last visited Dec. 6, 2011). (At some point during 2009 some professors realized 
that "regulators had no ability~ or legal framework~ to collect and share data on the global frnancial system 
and therefore no way to measure system-wide risk"). 
119 See Dodd-Frank Act§§ 151-156. (The OFR should assist policymakers~ regulators~ including FSOC to 
r:romote frnancial stability and enhance market discipline). 
20 See Dodd-Frank Act § 153(a) (The OFR is responsible for collecting~ processing~ and analyzing 
information about individual institutions and the frnancial system). 
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system. 121 In addition, the OFR will also be responsible for collecting data for the 
public. 122 To carry out its responsibilities the OFR has two centers from which it 
operates: a data center123 and a research and analysis center. 124 The OFR will make the 
results of its activities available to financial regulatory agencies and to the public.125 
The OFR carries an important and complex mandate. 126 The OFR will be largely 
dependent on accessing information in real time so that regulators can attempt to identify 
risk real-time. 127 The fact is that there are real-time constraints and general complexity 
problems in carrying out such a task. 128 The success of the OFR will require the 
information it is accessing is sufficiently fresh, a task that is not easily accomplished. 129 
Being able to give a real-time snap shot of market transactions is no easy task. 130 
The OFR will allow the Treasury Secretary, the FSOC, and other regulators to 
better understand complex financial products.131 It will also assist regulators in 
uncovering fraud and monitoring risks from LCFis. 132 Most of all, for the first time 
regulators will be able to see critical links between different firms in the financial 
market. 133 
121 U.S DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, Office of Financial Research Under the DoddOFrank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/OFR _F AQ-II2420 I 0-FINAL.PDF 
122 See Dodd-Frank Act§ I54(a)(l)(A) 
123 /d. at§ I54(a)(l)(A). The data center is supposed to collect, validate, and maintain the data necessary to 
help regulators identify vulnerabilities in the system as a whole. 
124 Id at § I 54( c). The research and analysis center is supposed conduct, coordinate, and sponsor research 
to support and improve regulation of financial firms and markets. 
125 Annette L. Nazareth, Margaret E. Tahyar, Transparency and confidentiality in the Post Financial Crisis 
World-Where to strike the Balance?, I HARv. Bus. L. REv 146, 150 
126 See generally Dodd-Frank Act§ 153 (the OFR is to assist the FSOC and other agencies). 
127 See generally Dodd-Frank Act§§ 151-156. 
128 !d. 
129 Id Utset, Supra note 114 at 838. 
130/d 
131 Id 
132 Id 
133 Id 
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The OFR already faces some complicated obstacles. Dodd-Frank is silent as to the 
exact type of information to be published.134 Senator Jack Reed proposed establishing the 
national institute of finance to support the OFR by creating a reference database. 135 
Senator's Reed's proposal did not make it into the enacted Dodd-Frank so this issue 
remains somewhat unclear. 136 There is some insight from Senator Reed's proposal that 
the published information would concern counter parties and their legal entities. 137 
Predicting the success of the OFR is difficult because it has the difficult mandate 
of coordinating large amounts of financial data. 138 It is now 20 11 and the OFR is already 
facing budget questions. 139 Politics aside, if under any scenario the OFR cannot 
adequately pay employees the agency will face retention problems and could fall victim 
to the issue of the revolving door. 140 Here, the revolving door is especially problematic 
because Wall Street tends to recruit former regulators via the revolving door. 141 If 
134 See Dodd-Frank Act § 154(b)(1)(B). See also Nazareth Supra note 125 at 152. (In order to effectively 
fulfill this task the OFR may "require the submission of periodic and other reports from any fmancial 
company for the purpose of assessing the extent to which a financial activity or financial market in which 
the fmancial company participates, or the fmancial company itself, poses a threat to the fmancial stability 
ofthe United States). 
135 SeeS. 3005, I lith Cong. (1st Session) (2010). 
136 Tracking the United States Congress, available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=slll-
3005 (describing how this bill never became law). 
137 See Id (A BILL To create an independent research institute, to be known as the "National Institute of 
Finance", that will oversee the collection and standardization of data on fmancial entities and activities, and 
conduct monitoring and other research and analytical activities to support the work of the Federal fmancial 
regulatory agencies and the Congress") . 
138 See Dodd-Frank Act § 153 
139 See Peter Schroeder, Republicans want details on new financial research office's budget, THE HILL Nov. 
14, 2011, available at http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-financial-institutions/193449-
republicans-want-details-on-new-fmancial-research-offices-budget (last visited Dec. 6, 2011 ). 
140 The revolving door can be defmed as the movement of employees into and out of government service. 
Kathryn L. Saurack, The Revolving Door: An Analysis of Post-Government Employment Restrictions on 
Foreign Representation, 14 J. L. & POLITICS 383 (1998). There are several reasons that the revolving exists. 
Among those reasons is "change is an inevitable part of the American democratic process." ld When a new 
political party moves into the White House there is an influx of new employees, appointees, and advisors at 
various levels of the government.ld. Furthermore, those who work for the government typically are willing 
to forgo a higher salary in the private sector for only a few years. I d. at 384 
141 See Project on Government Oversight, Revolving Regulators: SEC Faces Ethic Challenges with 
Revolving Door (May 13, 20 11), http://www.pogo.org/pogo-files/reports/financial-oversight/revolving-
regulators/fo-fra-20110513.html (discussing the importance of integrity at U.S. regulators) See also David 
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regulators at the OFR know that that their next employer is on Wall Street, they might not 
properly examine that future employer to find issues in their business practices. It is 
crucial to the success of the OFR that it does not become an agency that Wall Street 
controls because it will have tremendous access to financial information. 142 
Some scholars have asserted that the OFR director must create a culture of 
strength and independence.143 For the OFR to be successful the director of the agency 
must ensure that it is independent of special interests, and he or she must establish 
stronger standards for the employees who will influence the data integrity and analysis.144 
If the OFR can establish itself as a primer agency in the financial sector it can 
make up for some of the shortcomings in Dodd-Frank. The OFR will have to identify 
those risky Wall Street practices that will be allowed to continue where specific sections 
of Dodd-Frank failed to stop them. 
B. Financial Stability Oversight Council 
In section 111 the Dodd-Frank act establishes the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council.145 The FSOC functions as an overall economy watchdog. 146 The FSOC is a 
S. Hilzenrath, SEC Staffs 'Revolving Door' Prompts Concerns About Agency's Independence, Wash. Post, 
May 13, 2011, http://www. washingtonpost.com/businessleconomy/sec-sta.ffs-revolving-door-prompts-
concerns-about-agencys-independence/2011/05/12/AF9FOflG_story.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2011). 
Lawrence G. Baxter, "Capture" in Financial Regulation: Can We Channel It Toward the Common Good?, 
21 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 175, 197 (2011). 
142 See Dodd-Frank Act§§ 151-156. 
143 Taub, Jennifer S., Great Expectations for the Office of Financial Research. Vr. LAW SCHOOL, Research 
Paper No. 11-15. at 24 Available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract=1784298 ("The Director must also go 
beyond the statute's bare bones mandates and fill out an agency that is more than just an extension of the 
Treasury and that has the freedom to seek the advice of those economists and other experts who got it 
right") 
144 !d. 
145 Dodd-Frank Act§ 111(a) 
146 Cody Vitello, The Wall Street Refonn Act of2010 and What It Means for Joe & Jane Consumer, 23 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 99, 102 (20 10). 
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collaborative body chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury. 147 The FSOC is responsible 
for identifying risks to the overall stability of the United States, promoting market 
discipline and responding to emerging threats." 148 Congress intends that the FSOC 
remedy the fact that prior to the financial crisis "no regulator was responsible for the 
oversight of systemic risk created by large financial institutions or system-wide financial 
activities.'' 149 The FSOC creates the first collective body that will be accountable for 
identifying risks and responding to emerging threat to financial stability. 150 Essentially, 
the FSOC is tasked with constraining excessive risk in the financial system. 
The FSOC is granted unprecedented access to information from various agencies 
so that it can make informed decisions regarding systemic risk. 151 In order to successfully 
accomplish its task he FSOC has the power to collect and analyze information from and 
about financial institutions and financial activities in the United States. 152 Additionally, 
the FSOC can collect information from federal agencies, state agencies, and the Federal 
147 See Dodd-Frank Act§ 111(a) (describing the members of the FSOC) See also Supra Vitello at note 138 
at 103, 
The FSOC be chaired by the Treasury Secretary and include the heads of the Federal Reserve 
Board, Securities and Exchange Commission, Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Housing 
Finance Agency, National Credit Union Administration, CFPB, and an insurance expert. The five 
nonvoting members of the council will include the heads of the Federal Insurance Office, 
Office of Financial Research, and state banking, insurance, and securities regulators. Together 
these fmancial elites will have the power to create strict liquidity, capital, and leverage ratios; 
regulate nonbank fmancial companies; create minimum capital standards; break up large and 
complex companies; and prevent companies from switching regulators by amending their 
corporate charters in order to get a more favorable examiner. 
148 See Dodd-Frank Act § 112 
149 U.S DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, Office of Financial Research Under the DoddOFrank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/OFR _F AQ-112420 1 0-FINAL.PDF 
150 !d. 
151 See Nazareth Supra note 125 at 148. 
152 See Dodd-Frank Act§ 112 
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Insurance Office. 153 The FSOC can also use the resources of the OFR in collecting 
information. 154 
The FSOC has already proposed regulations, which would allow a company to 
submit written materials concerning whether, 'in the company's view' it could threaten 
the financial stability of the United States. 155 It is difficult to imagine companies being 
forthcoming with such information. While the FSOC will not be as subjected to the same 
issues as the OFR, it will be faced with the difficult task of coordinating the information 
from many different agencies. 156 One potential criticism of the FSOC is that historically 
multi-agency oversight bodies have been difficult to implement. 157 Much of the 
information the FSOC will require is going to be sensitive in nature and there might 
reluctance by those with the information to give it up. 158 
Unlike, the OFR the FSOC will not need to hire employees therefore nullifying 
Wall Street's ability to influence it via the revolving door. 159 The FSOC consists of 
multiple members and attempting to describe how Wall Street may try to influence each 
member is outside of the scope of this paper. 160 However, the Treasury Secretary, a 
political figure, which up until Timothy Geithner had been filled by an ex-Wall Street 
153 !d. 
154 See id. Nazareth Supra note 125 at 153 
155 Nazareth Supra note 121 at 149. Professor Nazareth describes the regulations as follows: 
Paragraph (a) provides that the Council will deliver written notice to a nonbank financial 
company that it is being considered for a proposed determination and will provide the nonbank 
fmancial company an opportunity to submit written materials to contest the proposed 
determination. Paragraph (a) clarifies that the nonbank fmancial company may submit any written 
materials to contest the determination, including materials concerning whether the nonbank 
fmancial company meets the standards for a determination. 
See also 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310, 1210.21 (20 11) (the proposed regulation) 
156 See Dodd-Frank Act § Ill 
157 See Dibadj Supra note 22 at 85. 
158 See Dodd-Frank Act § 112 
159 See Dodd-Frank Act§ Ill 
160 See Dodd-Frank Act § 112 
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executive, heads the FSOC. 161 In fact, with current Treasury Sectary Timothy Geithner 
rumored to be stepping down, Wall Street has begun to rally around possible 
replacements. 162 This paper argues that the FOSC mandate can be severally weakened if 
the Treasury Secretary has strong ties to Wall Street163 • In order to ensure the success of 
the FSOC, Congress should ensure that the Treasury Secretary is not someone that sides 
with Wall Street. 164 
The ability of the agency to successfully carry out its mandate is probably going 
to depend on the independence of the Treasury Secretary. 
Ill. A PROPOSAL FOR CONGRESS THE NEXT TIME IT CONSIDERS REFORMING WALL 
STREET 
Dodd-Frank is a Congressional response to a crisis in which Wall Street was the 
catalyst. 165 As described in this paper, it is difficult for Congress to carry its intent to 
161 In 2008 Timothy Geithner was chosen to become the next Treasury Secretary. CNBC, Wall Street 
Cheers Choice ofGeithner for Treasury, Nov. 2C 2008, available at, http://www.cnbc.com/id/27844707 
(last visited Dec. 6, 2011 ). Unlike he predecessor, Hank Paulson, Mr. Geithner had over 15 years of public 
sector experience prior to becoming Treasury Secretary. BIOGRAPHY.COM, Timothy Geithner, available at, 
http://www.biography.com/people/timothy-geithner-391494 (last visited Dec. 6, 2011). Moreover, he is 
not from one of the too big to fail banks that played a large role in the fmancial crisis. Id These facts are 
important in assessing whether the Treasury Secretary can function independently as the chairman of 
FSOC. See also, See Firedoglake, Wall Street Angles for Treasury Secretary Spot-They Didn't Have it 
Already?, http:/ /news. frredoglake.com/20 11/07 /05/wall-street-angles-for-treasury-secretary-spot-they-
didnt-have-it-already/ (general discussion of past Treasury Secratrites with wall street ties), 
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2006/12NY36.html (July 5, 2011, 1:36PM). 
162 See Peter Schroeder, Wall Street looks to fill Treasury Secretary post after Geithner exit, July 2, 2011, 
available at http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-fmancial-institutions/169521-wall-street-looks-
to-fill-treasury-post-after-potential-geithner-exit (last visited Dec. 6, 2011 ). 
163 See Firedoglake Supra note 161. 
164 See 31 U.S.C.A. § 301(a)-(c) ("The Department of the Treasury is an executive department of the 
United States Government at the seat of the Government. The head of the Department is the Secretary of 
the Treasury. The Secretary is appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate''). 
165 See Sen. Carl Levin, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Investment Banks, April4, 2010, 
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/campaign/94549-wall-street-and-the-fmancial-crisis-the-role-of-
investment-banks-sen-carl-levin (last visited Dec. 6, 2011 ). 
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reform Wall Street through the enactment of law. 166 Wall Streefs ability to influence 
those responsible for enacting a financial reform law, makes it difficult to envision a law 
being passed that makes drastic changes to Wall Street.167 Furthermore, the nature of two 
party politics favors Wall Street because it can back whatever party is not attempting to 
refonn the financial industry. 168 Additionally, regulators are condemned for tightening 
regulatory conditions when the economy is doing well. 169 In order for agencies like the 
OFR and FSOC to have an impact on risky Wall Street practices they will need the 
support of the of the government and the courage to reign in Wall Street during times of 
expansion. 170 
With these facts in mind, this paper proposes that a systemic emergency fund can 
undercut Wall Street's influence while simultaneously allowing Congress to reform Wall 
Street before another financial crisis occurs. 
A. Recommendation: Systemic Insurance fund 
Currently under Dodd-Frank there too many steps that have to be taken to address 
a problematic LCFI. 171 This paper proposes that the next time Congress decides that is it 
would like to reform Wall Street it should consider a mandated Systemic Insurance Fund 
166 See Supra Part I. 
167 When President Barack Obama was elected in 2008 the financial services industry strongly backed him 
and his fellow democrats. Wilmarth, A Flawed and Inadequate Response, Supra note 14, at 1013. 
However, the passage of Dodd-Frank caused big fmancial institutions "to shift their support to Republicans 
in 2010." ld at 1013-1014. The new Republican House leaders "quickly announced their intention to 
oversee and influence the implementation of Dodd-Frank by federal agencies in order to secure outcomes 
that were more favorable to the fmancial services industry." !d. at 1014. 
168 !d. 
169 See Charles A.E. Goodhart, Central Banks' Function To Maintain Financial Stability: An Uncompleted 
Task, Vox, June 24, 2008, http:// www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1263, (last visited Dec. 6, 2011) 
(discussing generally the difficulties that regulators face). 
170 !d. (Discussing how regulators will need some combination of courage, "reliance on quantitative 
triggers, and independence from government if they are to have the strength of mind and purpose to to 
dampen financial booms." 
171 See Supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text. 
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("SElF" or "Fund") for firms covered by Dodd-Frank. 172 Professor Jeffrey N. Gordon and 
Attorney Christopher Muller propose that such a fund should be scaled to the current size 
of the U.S. economy: $1 trillion, in 2010. 173 The funding proposed for SElF would 
amount to approximately 7% of GDP and 2% of the current credit market debt, which is a 
good indicator of the financial sector size. 174 As proposed the fund would be scaled to the 
growth of the U.S. economy. 175 The fund proposed would require large financial firms to 
mutually self-insure against outbreaks of systemic distress. 176 
This paper argues that all financial firms should be forced to buy into the fund. 
Professor Jeffrey N. Gordon and Attorney Christopher Muller do not propose that there 
be forced enrollment. 177 This paper proposes that the fund would reform Wall Street 
because it would contain risk assessments, which would increase the cost of insurance for 
riskier businesses. 178 Those firms unwilling to pay the insurance will opt out of those 
businesses that become too costly because of the insurance payments. This proposal, if 
successful, would lower overall risk in the financial market, thereby, reforming Wall 
Street. In theory institutions would be smaller because carrying too many risky 
businesses would be very expensive. 
This paper argues that implementing something similar to the SEIF would allow 
Congress to reform Wall Street because Wall Street would be mandated to buy insurance. 
172 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank's Dangers and 
the Case for A Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 Y ALEJ. ON REG. 151, 204 (2011) (discussing the 
benefits of such a fund). 
173 Id. 
174 !d. at 205 
175 !d. 
176 ld. 
177 Professor Gordon and Attorney Muller believe that the government should be pre-fund the SElF. The 
paper argues that Wall Street will only truly be reformed if it is forced to pay into the fund from the 
beginning and is solely responsible for maintaining the cost of the fund. ld. 
r7s Id. 
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Such a proposal is less political polarizing than Congress attempting to directly dissolve 
risky Wall Street business. Implementing a SEIF is less complex than attempting to 
implement the various emergency provisions in Dodd-Frank. 179 A possible objection to 
this proposal is that is might increase TBTF because banks would be insured. 180 This 
paper argues that if Wall Street has to pay a high enough price for its risky behavior in 
advance, it will stop those practices that become too expensive, therefore, making firms 
smaller and more risk adverse. 
179 Professor Gordon and Attorney Muller propose two scenarios in which the fund's use would be 
triggered. 
!d. at 205 
Use of SElF would be permitted only by a consensus determination by the Treasury, the Fed, and 
the FDIC that systemic financial distress exists, that it cannot be adequately addressed by the use 
of nonemergency authority (including the FDIC's receivership power), and that it threatens 
to severely disrupt the U.S. economy. 
Alternatively, such an emergency could be invoked by super-majority vote of the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council. We also favor reinstating the FDIC's loan guarantee authority upon 
the same regulatory approval triggers that pertain to SElF, subject to the provision of a loan 
guarantee fee and the obtaining of warrants. 
Id at 211. 
180 Professor Gordon and Attorney Muller counter address TBTF concern. Both writers claim that using a 
fund like the one proposed would allow fmns to fail without disrupting the greater U.S. economy because it 
would limit adverse market response. !d. at 208. 
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CONCLUSION 
Congress responded to the near collapse of the U.S. economy in 2008181 , by 
passing Dodd-Frank. Dodd-Frank's is Congress's attempt to reform Wall Street182 
following what some pundits183 consider as the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression. 184 Surely, Congress will be to blame if any of those sections that were diluted 
play a crucial role in the next financial crisis. 
This paper shows, how the legislative process makes it difficult for legislators to 
successfully maintain their intent to reform Wall Street through the final enactment of a 
law. Congress should be credited for passing Dodd-Frank but the fact is that too many 
181 President Obama had to resort to a $862 billion stimulus package in order to prevent the U.S. from 
falling into a deeper recession. THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Debate rages over stimulus fallout, Feb. 23, 
20 10, available at http://www. washingtontimes.com/news/20 1 0/feb/23/world-of-debate-rages-over-fallout-
ftom-stimulus/?feat=home _headlines (last visited Dec. 6, 20 11) Ruth Stroppiana, chief international 
economist for Moody's Economy.com alleged "Governments and central banks around the world have 
spent more than $11 trillion to support the fmancial sector and about $6 trillion on fiscal stimulus 
programs." !d. 
182 When Congress passed the fmal version of Dodd-Frank it missed the opportunity to stand up to Wall 
Street because it made too many concessions. Dodd-Frank promised to end "too big to fail." However, the 
act in fact offers the government tools to deal with the failing firms, which means that too big to fail firms 
will continue to exist. The much "heralded derivative provisions" aggregate the risks of these products 
instead of reducing them. Dodd-Frank more than doubles the ceiling for insured bank deposits which puts 
the American taxpayer on the hook for any Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. losses. Furthermore, many 
sections of Dodd-Frank are to be enforced by "unelected bureaucrats." Mark A. Calabria, Dodd-Frank: 
Missed Opportunity, POLITICO, July. 7, 2011, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0711!59471.html (last 
visited Dec. 6, 2011) 
183 Jon Hilsenrath, Serena Ng, & Damian Paletta, Worst Crisis Since '30s, With No End in Sight, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 18, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122169431617549947.html (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2011). The authors describe the fmancial crisis and the potential damage it can do several large 
fmancial institutions and the overall economy. ld Steve Holland & Frances Kerry, Obama: US. in worst 
cnsts since Depression, REUTERS., Oct. 7, 2008, available at 
http://www .reuters.com/article/2008/1 0/0 8/usa-politics-debate-economy-idUSN07 49084220081008 (last 
visited Dec. 5, 2011). Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama said that U.S. is in the worst crisis 
since the Great Depression. !d.; See also, CNN, World Bank: Economy worst since Depression, Mar. 9, 
2009, available at http://money .cnn.com/2009/03/09/news/intemationaVglobal_ economy_ world_ bank/ 
(last visited Dec. 5, 2011) (discussing how the global economy would shrink as a result of the fmancial 
crisis). 
184 See Wilmarth, A Flawed and Inadequate Response, Supra note 14, at 953 (2011). See also Ben S. 
Bemanke, Chairman, U.S. Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the Swearing-In Ceremony, at Federal Reserve Board 
Washington, D.C. (Feb. 3, 2010), available at 
http://www. federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speechlbemanke20 1 00203 a.htm (Chairman Ben S. Bemanke 
describing the 2008 financial crisis as the deepest crisis since the great depression). 
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concessions were made. The real reforms in Dodd-Frank were left out. As a result, the 
OFR and FSOC are tasked with identifying the next crises before it occurs-a very 
difficult task. As the financial markets become more complex, Congress will have to 
make laws that either force Wall Street to insure itself or it will have to outlaw certain 
types of businesses altogether. In the meantime, Congress should consider making a law 
that would force Wall Street to pay for its risk before the next crisis occurs. Congress 
should get out of the business of trying to pass financial reform laws that cannot 
accomplish the goals set forth in the preamble. 
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